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Case No. 20090463-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JOEL SCOTT MCNEARNEY,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for burglary, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (wLst 2009).*
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether a fully built house ready for occupancy and being shown to
prospective buyers is a "dwelling," for purposes of the burglary statute?
Standard of Review. "[A] question of statutory interpretation, which is a
question of law, [is] reviewed for correctness. State v. Tanner, 2009 UT App 326,
221 P.3d 901 (citing State v. Jeffiies, 2009 UT 57, f 4, 217 .3d
F 265).
1

Citation to the Utah Code and the codes of other jurisdictions
throughout this brief is to the current code. Changes to sections of any code
which have been amended since the incident at issue in this case do not affect
the disposition of this case.

2. Whether the trial court erred in not giving a lesser included offense
instruction when it ruled, as a matter of law, that a building constructed to be
home is a dwelling?
Standard of Review. "A trial court's refusal to grant a lesser included
offense instruction is a question of law, which [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, % 12,154 P.3d 788.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN § 76-1-402 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-201 (West Supp.

2009), -202 (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), and
unlawful possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-205 (West 2004). Rl-2. Before trial, the trial court
accepted the parties' stipulation that a bag containing tools, toilet screw caps,
and a stolen key would be admissible in exchange for the dismissal of the
charges of theft and unlawful possession of burglary tools. R124:6-7. A jury
convicted Defendant of burglary, as charged. R60. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to a statutory one-to-fifteen-year term in the Utah State Prison, but
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suspended the prison term and placed Defendant on probation for thirty-six
months. R112-13. Defendant timely appealed. R115.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brent Roberts built two houses next to each other uh West Valley City, one
in which he resided and one of which he intended to ^ell. R124:28-29. The
house for sale had been on the market for about four months. Id. at 29. The
house was "completely finished/' and except for a refrigerator, all the
appliances were in. Id. at 30. "It was a totally functional house." Id. A "For
Sale" sign stood outside the house, which was being shown to people by a
realtor. Id. at 30, 41. The house was in a subdivision in which "just a few
homes [had been] built," among which perhaps one or two were being lived in.
Id. at 41.
On the evening of January 6,2008, Mr. Roberts weht to the house to turn
on a light and noticed that the front door knob had bebi "mashed" and the
realtor's key box had been taken. Id. at 31. Mr. Roberts immediately called the
police. Id. Officer Peck responded to the call. Id. at 32 He and Mr. Roberts
went through the house and found nothing had been disturbed. Id. at 32, 46.
Officer Peck, who was on call that night, gave Mr. Robert^ his card and then left.
Id. at 33.
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Concerned about security, Mr. Roberts placed a baby monitor in the house
so that he could hear any activity "if anything happens inside the house/ 7 Id.
He locked up the house and returned to his own home. Id. at 34. At about 9:30
that night he heard "at least a couple of voices" — "conversation going on" — and
things being taken apart and moved around inside the house —tools "clinking
and clanking." Id. at 34-35. Mr. Roberts called Officer Peck and told him what
he was hearing. Id. at 36.
Officer Chris Coombs quickly responded to the call. Id. at 36, 91. He,
with Mr. Roberts following behind, entered the house through the front door.
Id. They immediately saw that the rear sliding door was wide open. Id. When
they reached the master bathroom, they found that the toilet had been removed
from the pipe and the nuts for the toilet lay on the floor, but that the white screw
caps that cover the nuts were gone. Id. at 36-38,40. Someone had also begun to
remove the toilet in the other bathroom. Id. at 37.
West Valley City Police Officer Kevin Peck arrived at the scene after
Officer Coombs. Id. at 43-44,49-50. Observing Officer Coombs and Mr. Roberts
approaching the front door, Officer Peck drove around the corner to view the
rear of the house. R50. There he saw two men, dressed in black, running away.
Id. at 51. Officer Peck first pursued the men in his car, then on foot. Id. at 52-53.
After a chase, he apprehended Defendant. Id. at 53-57. Officer Peck searched
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Defendant and found in his pants pockets a key, a headlamp, and a couple of
white plastic caps. R58. The key was to the burgled hoiise. Id, at 63.
At the scene, Defendant admitted that he had gone to the front of the
house. Two sets of footprints were found leading from the rear of the house to
the front. Id, at 66-68. One set of prints appeared to match Defendant's boots.
Id, at 69. Following that same set of prints, Officer Peck fqmnd a black bag about
20 feet from the house. Id, at 70. Inside the bag were a number of tools typically
used in burglaries. R72-74. The other man who fled was never found. Id, at 64.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed
verdict to change the burglary of a dwelling charge, a second degree felony, to
burglary of a building, a third degree felony. Id, at 98. Defendant argued that
because the house was unoccupied and no one had ever spent the night in it, it
was not a " dwelling" within the meaning of the statu tp. Id, The trial court
denied the motion. Id, at 102.
Defendant testified that he was a project foreman trying to cut costs on a
remodeling project and that he accepted an offer from an acquaintance, Preston,
who said that he had a couple of toilets. R124:102-09. Defendant claimed that
he felt the circumstances were suspicious when the toilets were not at Preston's
house and they had to drive to the house in question late in the evening. Id, at
110-12. Preston, however, assured him that "it was fine. . everything is okay.'
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Id. at 112. When they arrived at the house, Preston, who was carrying a bag,
told Defendant to wait at the rear of the house. Preston went to the front of the
house, opened the rear sliding door from inside, and asked Defendant to come
in and help him. Id. at 113-15,118. In spite ot Preston's entreaties, Defendant
refused to enter because he now believed "there's something illegal going on."
Id. at 116-120. Preston went back into the darkened house. Id. at 121, 135.
Suddenly, he came out of the house yelling "Police. . . . The cops are here,"
knocking Defendant back, and handing him "some things." Id. at 121-22.
Defendant put the things in his pocket and ran. Id. at 122.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Defendant's request for
a lesser included offense instruction on third degree burglary. Id. at 147-49; see
R70 (Defendant's requested instruction on burglary of a "building"). At that
point, the court first elaborated its reasons for denying Defendant's motion for a
directed verdict. The court stated that it had read State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656
(Utah App. 1992) and its progeny "as not requiring that the dwelling actually be
inhabited, only that the purpose for which the dwelling is created is that it be
habitable." Id. at 148. Accordingly, the court ruled that its legal interpretation
of the statute precluded the requested instruction. Id. at 149. Based on its legal
interpretation and the absence of any evidence that the structure in question was
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not a home, the court also refused to allow Defendant tj) argue in closing that
the house was not a dwelling. Id. at 150-52.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by incorrectly interpreting the
term "dwelling" in denying his motion for a directed verdict to amend the
offense to a third degree burglary of a building. He contends that under Utah
law that a building is not a "dwelling" until it has been occupied by someone
who has not expressed an intent to abandon it. Contrary to Defendant's claim,
this Court has interpreted Utah's burglary statute to sweep more broadly. The
statute defines "dwelling" to mean any building "usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." This
Court has interpreted "usually occupied," to refer," not to whether the building
is actually occupied, but "to the purpose for which the structure is used." This
construction essentially recognizes that Utah's understanding of "dwelling," for
purposes of burglary, includes a building that are intended to serve as place of
habitation. This interpretation comports with Utah's interest in protecting
people in the security of their homes. The house at issue in this case was a
"completely finished," "totally functional house," up fot sale and being shown
by a realtor. The owner was visiting the house daily to secure it. Accordingly,
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there was a substantial likelihood that an intruder would encounter someone
within the house. In these circumstances, Defendant should not be permitted to
avoid a second degree felony on the happenstance that the house had not yet
sold or was not secured by the owner personally remaining on the premises.
II.
The trial court did not err in refusing to give a lesser included offense
instruction on third degree burglary of a building. The trial court correctly
interpreted the statute to mean that a house constructed to be a home, i.e., a
building usually occupied as a lodging at night, was a dwelling.

This

determination involved a question of law, and, as such, was not one for the jury
to determine. Even if that determination was not purely a question of law, the
court was still not required to give the instruction because there existed no
rational basis in the evidence that the house at issue was not a home intended to
be usually occupied as nighttime lodging.
ARGUMENT
I.
UNDER THE BURGLARY STATUTE, A HOUSE WHOSE
PURPOSE IS THAT IT BE USED FOR OVERNIGHT LODGING
IS A "DWELLING"
Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict to amend the offense to a third degree burglary of a building/'
Aplt. Br. at 9-16, at 9. Specifically, he argues that "[u]nder Utah law, a newly
-8-

built structure that has never been lived in, although constructed for the
purpose of human habitation, does not fit the statutory definition of a dwelling/'
Id. Defendant understates the reach of Utah's burglary statute.
Defendant does not challenge that he committed $ burglary. Indeed, he
requests that a conviction be entered for third degree felony burglary of a
building. Aplt. Br. at 22. Rather, he argues only that th4 house he burglarized
was not a dwelling, which makes his crime a third degree felony. Id. at 9-16.
Because Utah's statute and this Court have broadly interpreted the meaning of
"dwelling," the "completely finished/' "totally functional house" was a
dwelling for the purposes of the burglary statute.
"'Dwelling' means a building which is usually Occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." UTAH
CODE ANN. 76-6-201(2) (West Supp. 2009). Applying that definition, this Court
held that a mountain cabin, in which the owner, who lived in town and spent
only two or three days a week in the cabin, was a dwelling. State v. Cox, 826
P.2d 656, 658, 662 (Utah App. 1992). This Court held thkt "[t]he term 'usually
occupied' refers to the pwpose for which tlie structure is used!' Id. at 662
(emphasis added). "If the structure is one in which people typically stay
overnight, it fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute."
Id.

See also State v. Gates, 2006 UT App 256U, pp. 1-2 (unpublished
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memorandum decision) (applying Cox definition to hold a fully outfitted
mountain cabin, slept in the night before the burglary, was the type of structure
that could "typically be expected" to be used for overnight lodging and was,
therefore, a dwelling); State v. Oakley, 2005 UT App 89U, p. 1 (unpublished
memorandum decision) (applying Cox to hold evidence sufficient that
burglarized cabin was a dwelling).
"Purpose" is "[t]hat which one sets before him to accomplish; an end,
intention, or aim, object, plan, project." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
Thus, contrary to Defendant's argument, the building need not have a specific
occupant living in the structure on or about the time of the illegal entry, see Aplt.
Br. at 9-16. Rather, a dwelling is simply the type of structure that is intended or
expected to be one in which people typically stay overnight. This view is
bolstered by the fact that, for the purposes of burglary, the statute does not
require that a person be present at the time of the offense.
This Court's interpretation of the statutory definition of "dwelling" to
include a vacant structure in which no one has yet resided has been followed in
at least one other jurisdiction defining "dwelling" much like Utah does. In State
v. Hobbs, 2009 WL 2225529 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (attached at Addendum B),

-10-

two individuals bought a house to renovate and sell. Id. at p.l. 2 They never
lived in the house. Id. Four days before the scheduled closing on the house, one
of the owners discovered that the house had been broken into and building
material stolen. Id. The owner repaired the damage and hired two men to stay
in the house to secure it. Id. Two days before the expected closing, Hobbs was
apprehended after breaking into and entering the house. Id.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Hobbs' claim that the house was
not a dwelling because someone had not lived in the building in the immediate
past. Id. at 1-2. "The burglary statute/' the court began,' defines 'dwelling7 as 'a
building used as a permanent or temporary residence/" Minn. Stat. § 609.581(3)
(2009). The court noted that it had previously determined that the word "used"
in that definition is a participial adjective, not a verb, ^nd therefore "has no
tense." Id. at p.2 (citing State v. Edwards, 589 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999). Expanding, the court observed that "the word 'used' frequently is
'resorted to for such descriptive purposes even though the article being
described is not at the moment in actual use in any respect.'" Id. (quoting
Edwards, 589 N.W.2d at 810). The court also noted tjiat "the legislature's
concern 'about the distress and lingering fear' caused by residential burglary,
2

"Unpublished opinions of the [Minnesota] Coiirt of Appeals are not
precedential," but they may be cited with adequate notice to other counsel.
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 (2009).
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regardless of whether anyone is living in the building at the time of the
burglary/' Id. (citing State v. Kowski, 423 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988)). Based on that concern, the statutory language, and its prior opinions, the
court held that "a building may be considered a 'dwelling' within the meaning
of the burglary statute if its owner intends it to be used as a residence,
regardless of whether anyone is residing in the building at the time of the
burglary." Id.3

3

Other states have manifested the same objective with more specific
language. See e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-39-101 (4)(A) (2001) ("'Residential
occupiable structure' means a . . . structure (i) [i]n which any person lives [,] or
(ii) [t]hat is customarily used for overnight accommodation of a person whether
or not a person is actually present."); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.011(2) (2007)
("'Dwelling' means a building... which has a roof over it and is designed to be
occupied by people lodging therein at night
");, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 26(b) (1987) ("'[D] welling' means a house [or] mobile h o m e . . . which at the time
of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence
intend within a reasonable period of time to reside."); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 213110(7) (2008) ("'Dwelling' means a b u i l d i n g . . . or other enclosed space which
is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.").
Accordingly, courts in those states have concluded that structures in
circumstances similar to the house in this case were dwellings. See Julian v.
State, 767 S.W.2d 300 (Ark. 1989) (mobile home was "occupiable structure"
within meaning of burglary statute even though no one was residing in it and
even though owner had never set it up for occupancy by attaching utilities,
where structure was of a type customarily used for overnight lodging and was
indistinguishable from other mobile homes located together and rented); State v.
Bennett, 565 So. 2d 803, 804-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (unsold
mobile home on sales lot, which was fully furnished but unoccupied and not
connected to utilities, would constitute a "dwelling" for purposes of burglary
prosecution if it was actually to be used for habitation); State v. Alvis, 53 P.3d
1232,1233-34 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (unoccupied house still under construction
-12-

Like Minnesota, this Court in Cox has simultaneously recognized the
forward-looking character of the term "usually occupied," — i.e., the "purpose"
or intent intrinsic to the structure itself—and the breadth of legislative concern
in protecting people. The Cox court thus concluded that "our second degree
burglary statute is intended to protect people while in places where they are
likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting property in
buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages." Coxf 829 P.2d at 662
(emphasis added). Other authorities have emphasized that protection of the
home is the paramount concern of the burglary statutes:
The notable severity of burglary penalties is accounted for by the
fact that the offense was originally confined to violent nighttime
assault on the dwelling. The dwelling was and remains each man's
castle, the final refuge from which he need not flee even if the
alternative is to take the life of an assailant. It is the place of
security for his family, as well as his most cherished possessions.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES

§ 221.1 at 67 (Official Draft and

Revised Comments 1980).
Defendant's argument, on the other hand, dobs not adequately or
reasonably support the legislative purpose of protecting people likely to be
residing in a house such as the one in this case. Defendant's authorities insist
that to qualify as a dwelling a "building... is used regularly as a place to sleep.

but into which owner was to move in 5 days was dWellin g for purpose of
burglary statute and thus a "person" felony for sentencing purposes).
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. . [and] [i]t is not such before the first dweller has moved in nor after the last
dweller has moved out with no intention of returning . . . ." Aplt. Br. at 11
(quoting Wallace v. State, 494 A.2d 970, 974 (Md. Ct. App 1985)) (brackets
added). 4 As explained, the construction Defendant assigns to "dwelling" — the
actual or prior occupancy of the building—is not that by which this Court, by its
use of the phrase, " purpose for which the structure is used," has defined
"dwelling." Further, these authorities do not adequately take into account that
"[Utah's] second degree burglary statute is intended to protect people while in
places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight

" Cox, 829 P.2d

at 662 (emphasis added).
The State does not dispute that prior occupancy without notice of intent to
abandon may well indicate the likelihood of present, ongoing occupancy. But in
drafting the burglary statutes the legislature made a policy decision that a
homeowner's possible presence would not be left to chance. The legislature
determined to apply the greater penalty to any person who, with the requisite
4

See also Aplt Br. at 13-15, wherein Defendant cites a number of cases,
including Watson v. State, 179 So. 2d 826,827 (Miss. 1965) (building, intended as
dwelling, under construction and nearing completion but not yet occupied was
not a dwelling house under statute); Johns v. Commonwealth, 675 S.E.2d 211, 21415 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (building under renovation, unfurnished, and without
electricity must actually have been used as habitation to constitute a dwelling).
But see Starnes v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Ky. 1980) (house from
which owners were moving and from which personalty was stolen was still
"usually occupied").
-14-

intent, unlawfully entered the kind of building " usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night" because one cannot know when such a building might
have someone in it. That is the reason the statute completes the definition of
"dwelling" by providing "whether or not a person is actually present. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2). Thus, a burglar bears the risk of incurring the greater
penalty whenever he burglarizes the kind of building people usually occupy.
Society does not bear that risk.
The house at issue is the type of building the legislature sought to protect
with the greater penalty — a building in which there might be a person. The
house was "completely finished" — except for a refrigerator, all the appliances
were in." R124:30. "It was a totally functional house." Id. The house had been
on the market for about four months, a "For Sale" sign stq>od outside the house,
and it was being shown to people by a realtor. Id. at 3D-31, 41. There were
other newly built houses in the subdivision being lived in. Id. at 41. Mr.
Roberts, the owner of the house, had built his own home next door. Id. at 29.
He was apparently at the house daily, turning the lights bn in the house in the
evenings for some time prior to the burglary. Id. at 31. Indeed, if Mr. Roberts
did not have the baby monitor close at hand, by which he could listen for any
activity from the safety of his own home, he might Very well have been
compelled to stand watch within the house once he ha|i discovered that the
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keybox had been taken. Id. at 31, 34. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the
house was not merely a building, a structure "adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons." Aplt. Br. at 13 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6201(1) (West Supp. 2009). Rather, the circumstances of this case flesh out "the
purpose for which the structure is used": a house which will unquestionably be
used for overnight lodging and one in which people will "typically stay
overnight." See Cox, 656 P.2d at 662. In such circumstances, Defendant should
not be permitted to avoid a second degree felony on the happenstance that the
house, fully ready to be moved into, was not yet sold or was not personally
being secured by the owner.
II.
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT A HOME IS A DWELLING AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND
NO
EVIDENCE
CONTRADICTED
THAT
INTERPRETATION, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON
BURGLARY OF A BUILDING
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to send the case to the
jury with his requested lesser included offense instruction on third degree
burglary of a building, thereby denying him the right to submit his theory of the
defense. Aplt. Br. at 16-21. Because the trial court correctly determined that the
fully completed home was, as a matter of law, a dwelling, Defendant was not
entitled to the instruction.
-16-

A. Background facts.
The trial court denied Defendant's request for a lesser included offense
instruction on third degree burglary. Id. at 147-49; see R70 (Defendant's
requested instruction on burglary of a "building"). The court stated that it had
read Cox and its progeny "as not requiring that the dwelling actually be
inhabited, only that the purpose for which the dwelling is created is that it be
habitable/' Id. at 148. The court particularly relied on State v. Herrick, 965 P.2d
844 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998), in which the Kansas Court of Appeals, relying on a
definition of dwelling as a building intended for use as hitman habitation, supra
n.3, held that an unoccupied house, strewn with doors ahd windows and used
as storage was nevertheless a dwelling. Id.5 Accordingly, the court ruled that
this Court's legal interpretation of the statute in Cox precluded the requested
instruction. Id. at 149. Based on Cox's interpretation ahd the absence of any
evidence that the structure in question was not a home, the court also refused to
allow Defendant to argue in closing that the house was not a dwelling. Id. at
150-52.

5

The record does not state the name of the case, btat the facts recited by
the trial court—a Kansas decision describing wood and "^vhat have you strewn
around and that it was being used solely for storagp" — describe Herrick.
R124148.
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B. Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser
included offense of burglary of a building,
'Tactual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such
as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as
well as the subjective, such as state of mind/' State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ^j 16,
220 P.3d 1198 (refusing to reach the issue of whether a defendant in Utah has
the right to have a jury determine the fact of his prior convictions before he can
be sentenced because it raised a pure question of law) (citation omitted).
"Questions of law are 'essentially [questions] of rules or principles uniformly
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances/" Id.
(citation omitted).

"[Tjhe United States Supreme Court . . . stated that

'mischievous consequences . . . would flow from' permitting juries to answer
questions of law." Id. at f 14 (citation omitted). "What one jury may 'declare
constitutional today another jury may declare unconstitutional tomorrow/" Id.
(citation omitted). "Thus, it is the role of the judge to 'instruct the jury on the
law and to insist that the jury follow his [or her] instructions/" Id. (citation
omitted). "It is the role of the jury to find facts and apply them to the judge's
instructions on the law." Id. (citation omitted). "Thus, a defendant does not
have the right, constitutional or statutory, to a jury trial when only 'pure
questions of law' need to be decided." Id. (citation omitted).
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Here, the trial court decided a pure question of law, to wit: Whether the
statutory definition of "dwelling/' includes a fully completed home, ready for
occupancy. Here, the trial court correctly ruled that a building constructed to
be a home was, as a matter of law, a dwelling. R124:148, As a principle of law,
that matter was not for the jury to decide otherwise. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, f 16.
Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to give the instruction. But even if
this Court deemed the question not to be one of law, defendant was still not
entitled to the instruction.
"[A] defendant is entitled to a requested leaser-included offense
instruction if (1) the two offenses are related because sime of their statutory
elements overlap, and the evidence at trial of the greater offense involves proof
of some or all of those overlapping elements; and (2) the evidence provides a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense. State v. Evans, 2001 UT
22, If 18, 20 P.3d 888 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983)). "In
determining existence of a rational basis, the court does not judge the credibility
of the evidence, but only decides "whether there is a Sufficient quantum of
evidence presented to justify sending the question to the jury." State v. ]aimez,
819 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Baker, 671 P2d at 159). "Further,
the court must view the evidence and the inferences that ckn be drawn from it in
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the light most favorable to the defense/' Id. (citing State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527,
532 (Utah 1983)).
Section 76-1-402(3) states that a lesser offense is included when "[i]t is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (West
2004). For purposes of this case, the State does not dispute that third degree
burglary of a building is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary of a
dwelling.
Defendant's request for the lesser included instruction, however, does not
survive the rational basis test. The trial court concluded that no evidence
showed the house at issue was not a home. R124:152. The record indisputably
supports that conclusion, and Defendant does not dispute it. See Cox, 826 P.2d
at 662-63 (upholding denial of request for lesser included instruction where "no
evidence was presented suggesting that [the] defendant entered the property
with intent to commit a crime other than theft"); Ryan v. State, 865 So. 2d 1239,
1243-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding evidence did not support giving of jury
instruction on second-degree burglary, as lesser-included offense of first-degree
burglary, where trial court determined, as matter of law, that hunting house
was "dwelling" for purposes of first-degree burglary statute, and not
"building," and no evidence indicated hunting house was anything other than

-20-

dwelling). In sum, because the trial court correctly determined that a house
constructed to be a home, i.e., a building to be usually occupied for overnight
lodging, and no evidence was presented that the house in question was not
constructed for that purpose, Defendant was not entitled to a lesser included
offense instruction on third degree burglary. Cox, 826 P.2d at 662-63.
If, however, the Court should determine that the trial court erred in ruling
that the constructed home was a building, the Court should remand the case to
the district court with instruction that a conviction for third degree burglary be
entered, as Defendant has requested. Aplt. Br. at 22.

Utah appellate courts

may modify criminal convictions and enter judgments oi conviction for a lesser
included offense on appeal." State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d146,150 n.2 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (West 2C)04); State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201,1209-11 (Utah 1993). See State v. Bolsinger, 699
P.2d 1214,1221 (Utah
1985) (remanding case to the trial court with directions to set aside the verdict
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter! where the defendant
conceded that his conduct created a grave risk of harm which necessarily
includes "recklessness," the requisite state of mind for manslaughter), disagreed
with on other grounds, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 rl.3 (Utah 1991).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted May 13,2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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§ 76-1-402 (West 2004) Separate offenses krising out of single
criminal episode-Included offenses

UTAH CODE ANN.

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any |;such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a sin|gle criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant sball not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at tfie time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the ofil[ense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offel se. An offense is so
included when:

E

(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the| facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judg]jment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered br the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-201 (West Supp. 2009) - Definitions

As used in this part:
(l)(a) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or
for carrying on business and includes:
(i) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(ii) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.
(b) "Building" does not include a railroad car.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully" means a person enters or remains in or on any premises
when:
(a) at the time of the entry or remaining, the premises or any portion of the premises
are not open to the public; and
(b) the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or any portion of the premises.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
(5) "Railroad car":
(a) in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a sleeping car or any container or
trailer that is on a railroad car; and
(b) includes only a railroad car that is operable and part of an ongoing railroad
operation.

Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-201; Laws 2008, c. 366, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.

UTAH CODE ANN,

§ 76-6-202 (West 2004) - Burglary

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in
the building.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-202; Laws 2001, c. 359, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001,
1st Sp.Sess., c. 4, § 2, eff. July 5, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 325, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
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(Cite as: 2009 WL 2225529 (Minn.App.))
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS
DESIGNATED AS UNPUBLISHED AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC.
480A.08(3).
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Willie James HOBBS, Appellant.
No. A08-1073.
July 28, 2009.

house, intended o sleep there for the night
at the time of the burglary. Further, there
was no evidence that defendant intended to
abandon the house M.S.A.S 609.581.
Hennepin County District Court, File No.
27-CR-07-12072B.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul,
MN, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin
County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Lawrence Hamiherling, Chief Appellate
Public Defender, Rachel Foster Bond, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

West KeySummary
Burglary 67 ^ " ^ 4 1 ( 8 )
67 Burglary
6 711 Prosecution
67k40 Weight and Sufficiency of
Evidence
67k41 In General
67k41(8) k. Character and
Ownership of Premises. Most Cited Cases
Sufficient evidence existed that house was a
"dwelling" for defendant's conviction for
first-degree burglary. The evidence indicated that victim renovated, maintained, and
sold the house as a single-family home.
When victim saw that the house had been
damaged, he took precautions to secure the
house pending its imminent sale. As a result,
two people were lawfully present in the

Considered and decided by BJORKMAN,
Presiding Judge WORKE, Judge; and
STAUBER, Judgi
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAK Judge.
*1 In this appeal from his conviction of firstdegree burglary, appellant argues that (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the building he entered wras
not a "dwelling" within the meaning of the
burglary statute, Minn.Stat §§ 609.581,
subd. 3, .582, subd. 1(a) (2006), and (2) the
district court erred in instructing the jury
regarding the definition of "dwelling." We
affirm.
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FACTS
In March 2005, A.S. and his father-in-law
purchased a single-family home located at
2909 Bryant Avenue North in Minneapolis.
A.S. renovated the house and put it on the
market in September 2006. The sale of the
property was scheduled to close on October
31,2007.
On October 27, 2007, while conducting his
weekly check of the vacant house, A.S. discovered that someone had broken in through
a basement window and stolen copper piping. He replaced the piping and hired two
individuals, J.W. and T.H., to stay in the
house until the closing to prevent future
break-ins. J.W. and T.H. arrived at the house
at approximately 8:30 p.m. on October 29,
2007, bringing a gun for protection. They
were checking window locks throughout the
house when they heard a noise in the basement. T.H. ran down to the basement, where
he saw a man halfway through a basement
window. The man appeared to be entering
the house, and T.H. yelled at him to get out.
J.W. fired the gun at the man, who yelled,
"Ow," and left. J .W. then called 911, and
Officer Christopher Tuma of the Minneapolis Police Department responded. J.W. and
T.H. gave Tuma a description of the intruder.
Around the same time, Minneapolis Police
Officer Ross Lapp responded to a 911 call
from 3811 Bryant Avenue North regarding a
shooting victim. As Lapp approached that
house, he saw appellant Willie Hobbs, who
was wearing clothing that matched the description of the intruder and had sustained a
gunshot wound.
Hobbs was charged with first-degree bur-

glary of an occupied dwelling. Hobbs
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that
the house at 2909 Bryant was not a "dwelling" on October 29, 2007; the district court
denied the motion. At Hobbs's request, the
district court instructed the jury on both the
charged offense and the lesser-included offense of third-degree burglary. The jury acquitted Hobbs of third-degree burglary but
found him guilty of first-degree burglary.—
This appeal follows.
FN1. Hobbs subsequently moved for
a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the verdicts were inconsistent. The
district court denied the motion, and
Hobbs does not challenge the denial
in this appeal.
DECISION
I. A single-family home that is vacant
during renovation or pending sale is a
"dwelling" for purposes of the burglary
statute.
Hobbs argues that the house at 2909 Bryant
was not a "dwelling" within the meaning of
the burglary statute and that the district court
erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of "dwelling." Because both of Hobbs's
arguments implicate the statutory definition
of "dwelling," we first examine the language
of the burglary statute. See State v. Edwards,
589 N.W.2d 807. 810 (Minn.App. 1999) ("A
burglary conviction will not be sustained
where the building is not within the statutory
definition."), review denied (Minn. May 18.
1999).
*2 The primary objective of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature." Minn.Stat. §

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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645.16 (2008); see also State v. Zeimet 696
N.W.2d 79U 793-94 (Minn.2005). "Where
the legislature's intent is clearly discernable
from plain and unambiguous language,
statutory construction is neither necessary
nor permitted and we apply the statute's
plain meaning." State v. Williams, 762
N.W.2d 583, 585 (Minn.ApD.2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 27,
2009).

of time the owher has been away, if the
owner does not intend to abandon it. Id. at
709-10. "An owner's intent to return to a
dwelling is the crucial factor in determining
whether a structure retains its character as a
dwelling in the owner's absence ." Id. at 710.
Because the owner in Kowski intended to
return and use k as a residence, we concluded that the vacant and unfinished vacation home was a f1dwelling." A*

The burglary statute defines "dwelling" as
"a building used as a permanent or temporary residence." Minn.Stat. § 609.581, subd.
3. We have previously determined that the
word "used" in that definition is a participial
adjective, not a verb, and therefore "has no
tense." Edwards, 589 N.W.2d at 811 (observing that the word "used" frequently is
"resorted to for such descriptive purposes
even though the article being described is
not at the moment in actual use in any respect" (quotation omitted)). The word "residence" commonly means "[t]he act or fact
of living in a given placesfor some time," or
"[a] house or other fixed abode." Black's
Law Dictionary 1335 (8th ed.2004); see also
The American Heritage Dictionary 1483
(4th ed.2006) (defining "residence" as "[t]he
place in which one lives").

Hobbs contends that our subsequent decision in Edwards added a second requirement
for a building to be considered a dwellinguse of the building as a residence in the immediate past. But Hobbs misconstrues Edwards, which explicitly distinguished
Kowski based on unique facts. Edwards, 589
N.W.2dat811. We held in Edwards that the
apartment of a recently murdered woman
was a "dwelling,' despite the lack of evidence regarding the woman's future intention with respect to the apartment, because
the "apartment had immediate past residential use." Id. We explained that the Kowski
intent requirement "is used to distinguish
between buildings that are residences, be
they temporary or permanent, and buildings
that are abandoned." Id. Although Edwards
further analyzed the language of the burglary statute, explaining the adjectival nature
of the word "used? in the statutory definition
of "dwelling," Edwards did not replace or
modify Kowski.

We previously interpreted the term "dwelling" in a case similar to this one involving a
house that was vacant at the time of a burglary. In State v. Kowski, we discussed the
burglary of an unfinished vacation home.
423 N.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Minn.App. 1988).
Cognizant of the legislature's concern "about
the distress and lingering fear" caused by
residential burglary, regardless of whether
anyone is living in the building at the time
of the burglary, we held that a building "remains a dwelling" regardless of the amount

*3 Based on the plain language of the statute
and our previous interpretations of that language in Kowski and Edwards, we conclude
that a building* may be considered a "dwelling" within the meaning of the burglary
statute if its owner intends it to be used as a
residence, regardless of whether anyone is
residing in the building at the time of the
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burglary. Thus, the definition of "dwelling"
in the burglary statute includes a singlefamily home that is vacant during renovation
or pending sale.
II. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's
determination that the house at 2909 Bryant was a dwelling.
Hobbs argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the house at 2909 Bryant
was a "dwelling." On a claim of insufficient
evidence, we conduct a thorough review of
the record to determine "whether the facts in
the record and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the jury to
reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis v.
State, 595 N.W.2d 520. 525 (Minn. 1999)
(quotation omitted). We review the record in
the light most favorable to the conviction
and will not disturb the verdict if the jury,
acting with due regard for the presumption
of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty as
charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn.2004).
There is no dispute that the house at 2909
Bryant was a single-family home intended
for use as a residence. Although A.S. did not
live in the house on October 29, 2007, there
is no evidence that he intended to abandon
the house. Rather, A.S. renovated, maintained, and sold the house as a single-family
home. When he saw that the house had been
damaged, he took precautions to secure the
house pending its imminent sale. As a result,
two people were lawfully present in the
house, intending to sleep there for the night,
at the time of the burglary. The evidence
supports the jury's finding that the house at

2909 Bryant was a "dwelling."
III. The district court did not err in instructing the jury on the definition of
"dwelling."
Hobbs also argues that the district court
erred in instructing the jury on the definition
of "dwelling." District courts have considerable latitude in formulating jury instructions.
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 681-82
(Minn.2007). We review jury instructions
"in their entirety to determine whether they
fairly and adequately explained the law of
the case." State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150,
155 (Minn. 1988). A jury instruction is erroneous "if it materially misstates the law."
State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 736
(Minn.2005).
Over Hobbs's objection, the district court
instructed the jury as follows:
The elements of burglary in the first degree are, first, the property involved in this
case was a dwelling. A dwelling means a
building used as a permanent or temporary
residence. A building used as a permanent
or temporary residence does not lose its
residential character simply because it has
been vacant for a certain period of time so
long as the owner did not permanently
abandon it.
*4 The first two sentences oi ine msiruciion
came from the jury-instruction guide, 10
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJ1G
17.02
(2006), but the district court added the last
sentence based on Edwards and Kowski.
Hobbs argues that the instruction amounted
to a directed verdict and misstated the lawr.
We disagree.
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First, the instruction did not effectively direct a verdict against Hobbs because the district court's further instruction on the elements of third-degree burglary demonstrated
that the jury could find the dwelling element
was not met. The district court explained
that the law permits a conviction of a lesser
crime if the jury finds a person not guilty of
the greater crime and instructed the jury that
"[a] lesser crime in this case is burglary in
the third degree." The district court also
stated that the jury could find Hobbs guilty
of third-degree burglary if it found all the
elements of that offense met but some of the
elements of first-degree burglary not met.
The only elements of first-degree burglary
that are not elements of third-degree burglary are the status of the building as a
dwelling and the presence of another person
in the building at the time of the offense.
Compare Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a)
with Minn.Stat $ 609.582, subd. 3 (2006).
There is no dispute that others were present
at 2909 Bryant when Hobbs entered the
house. Because the third-degree-burglary
instruction indicated to the jury that it could
reasonably find the dwelling element not
met, the first-degree-burglary instruction did
not direct the jury's verdict.

Inn.App.)

Affirmed.
Minn.App.,2009
State v. Hobbs
Not Reported in Js[.W.2d, 2009 WL 2225529
(Minn.App.)
END OF DOCUMENT

Second, the "dwelling" instruction was not a
misstatement of the law. As the district court
indicated, the instruction was drawn directly
from Kowski, in which we not only held that
a building remains a dwelling "[rjegardless
of the length of time an owner is absent
from the structure," but also determined that
"the legislature did not intend that a structure lose its residential character simply because it is vacant for a certain period of time
before the burglary." 423 N.W.2d at 710.
The district court did not err in instructing
the jury on the meaning of "dwelling,"
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